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INTRODUCTION
On St. Patrick’s Day 2011, Representative Louise Slaughter of New
York introduced a bill that she had introduced three times before.1 Along
with Representative Tim Waltz of Minnesota, Representative Slaughter
introduced the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act
for consideration by the U.S. House of Representatives.2 The STOCK Act
explicitly prohibits members of Congress and their staff from trading on
material, nonpublic information received because of their congressional
status.3
No more than thirteen members of the House had cosponsored each
prior introduction of the bill.4 The 2011 version of the bill was keeping
1

President Obama Praises Slaughter for Her Work to End Insider Trading in Congress as He
Signs STOCK Act into Law, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://louise.house.gov/press-releases/president-obama-praises-slaughter-for-her-work-to-end-insidertrading-in-congress-as-he-signs-stock-act-into-law/.
2
H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011).
3
President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1. As enacted, the STOCK Act required
disclosure of staff and members’ stock or commodity transactions that exceed $1000. Id. In the spring
of 2013, however, Congress passed and the President signed a bill stripping the STOCK Act of its
online disclosure requirement as it pertains to congressional staff and Executive Branch employees. The
move followed the release of a National Academy of Public Administration report claiming that a
searchable disclosure database of congressional and agency employee trading poses a risk to national
security, among other things. See Eric Yoder, Federal Employee Financial Disclosures to Remain
Offline, WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
federal-eye/wp/2013/04/15/federal-employee-financial-disclosures-to-remain-offline/.
4
President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1.
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pace with its predecessors’ cosponsor count until November 13th, when 60
Minutes aired a segment about the trading activities of members of
Congress, including House Speaker John Boehner, House Financial
Services Committee Chairman Spencer Bachus, and Minority Leader
Nancy Pelosi.5 The following day, the list of STOCK Act cosponsors more
than doubled.6 By the end of the week, ninety-two members of the U.S.
House of Representatives had signed on to the bill, and within three
months, 286 members of the House, representing both parties, had
cosponsored the STOCK Act.7 Shortly thereafter, the Senate took up the
measure, and in a rare turn of bipartisanship and efficiency for the 112th
Congress,8 the two houses passed the STOCK Act in March 2012.9
President Obama signed the bill the following month.10 Call it the power of
the media, an ethically reinvigorated Congress, or even the will of the
people, but the newly enacted STOCK Act promised consequences for
corrupt members of Congress.
The Act’s passage was timely. Just months before, members of
Congress had been reassured that they would enjoy a more expansive
interpretation of legislative privilege in the D.C. Circuit than at any other
point in American history.11 Legislative privilege, which derives from the
Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution,12 allows members of
Congress to withhold certain information pertaining to legislative acts that
could otherwise be used against them in a court of law.13 In 2007, the D.C.
Circuit applied the broad and previously unrecognized legislative privilege
of evidentiary nondisclosure in the case of United States v. Rayburn House
5

60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information? (CBS television broadcast Nov. 13,
2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-oninside-information/; see Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Look to Rein in Their Investing, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS
(Nov. 28, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/lawmakers-look-to-rein-intrading/.
6
See Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012): H.R. 1148 Cosponsors, THOMAS
(LIBR. OF CONGRESS), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR01148:@@@P (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014).
7
Id. Boehner, Pelosi, and Bachus were not among the 286 cosponsors. See id.
8
For commentary on the perceived failures of the 112th Congress, see Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why
This Is the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 13, 2012, 8:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-the-worstcongress-ever/.
9
Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012): S.2038 Major Congressional Actions,
THOMAS (LIBR. OF CONGRESS), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN02038:@@@R (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014); see also Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-105, 126 Stat. 291.
10
See STOCK Act § 19, 126 Stat. at 305.
11
See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
12
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
13
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
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Office Building.14 Prior to Rayburn, legislative privilege was largely
understood as a testimonial privilege so members of Congress did not have
to testify about their involvement in legislative acts; the privilege did not
include the privilege of nondisclosure—the privilege to withhold
documents sought under a lawful warrant.15 The Supreme Court denied the
Government’s petition for certiorari in Rayburn,16 and the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Rayburn changed the scope of legislative privilege by permitting
members of Congress to withhold information even in the face of a valid
warrant.17
Only two months before the passage of the STOCK Act, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in a case from the Ninth Circuit, United States v.
Renzi, that if affirmed by the Court could have threatened the new, broad
privilege recently granted in Rayburn.18 In Renzi, the Ninth Circuit denied
former Representative Richard Renzi’s claim that legislative privilege
included the privilege of nondisclosure.19 By denying Renzi’s petition, the
Supreme Court declined to consider the first viable, post-Rayburn
challenge to the legislative privilege of nondisclosure. In other words, two
months prior to passage of the STOCK Act, the D.C. Circuit’s
unprecedented interpretation of legislative privilege no longer faced any
outside threats, and nondisclosure as part of legislative privilege was here
to stay.
The question then remains: what happens when congressional
members’ expanded legislative privilege to withhold documents sought by
prosecutors collides with Congress’s own directive to the Executive Branch
to prosecute members for insider trading? This Note explores the postRayburn tension between the Executive’s enforcement of the STOCK Act
and Congress’s legislative privilege. Hampered by the expansive definition
of legislative privilege in Rayburn, the Executive Branch may face
prohibitive barriers to uncovering evidence of an exchange of material,
nonpublic information between, for example, a constituent and a member

14

497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1295 (2008).
Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or Debate Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or NonDisclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385, 417–21 (2012).
16
Rayburn House Office Bldg., 552 U.S. 1295.
17
Harrell, supra note 15, at 385.
18
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
19
Id. at 1039.
15

610

108:607 (2014)

Congressional Arbitrage

of Congress.20 Such evidence is critical to bringing and winning a case
against a member of Congress for insider trading.21
Given the evidentiary obstacles to effective enforcement created by
Rayburn, the STOCK Act represents a risk-free opportunity for political
gain by the Legislative Branch that leaves the Executive to do Congress’s
bidding and pursue fruitless prosecutions. Congress’s arbitrage opportunity
thus comes at the expense of the Executive and threatens the balance and
separation of powers. This Note argues that if legislative privilege is
understood as an institutional privilege of Congress rather than an
individual privilege of each member of Congress, the courts may recognize
an institutional, congressional waiver of legislative privilege for any and all
members charged under the STOCK Act. Such a waiver would restore the
ability of the Executive to effectively prosecute under the STOCK Act and
would alleviate separation of powers concerns.
Part I of this Note identifies the underlying purpose of the Speech or
Debate Clause and then distinguishes between the two theoretical
interpretations of legislative privilege as either an individual guarantee or
an institutional guarantee. A court’s understanding of legislative privilege
as either an individual privilege of each member of Congress or an
institutional privilege of Congress as a body will inform whether Congress
can constitutionally waive the privilege’s application to its members in a
given act.
Part II of this Note examines the doctrine of legislative privilege
within the context of bribery. This doctrine reveals that the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Rayburn represents a move toward a hyperindividualistic
understanding of legislative privilege that puts the privilege at odds with
the Clause’s purpose to maintain a separation of powers. Part III details the
passage of the STOCK Act and the arbitrage opportunity created by
legislative privilege doctrine. This arbitrage opportunity allowed Congress
to enact a risk-free policing measure for its ranks that could potentially use
the Executive Branch as a pawn in the game. Finally, Part IV argues that
courts should approach legislative privilege as an institutional privilege of
Congress. This approach will then allow courts to recognize a waiver of
privilege in the STOCK Act in order to prevent what is otherwise
congressional arbitrage at the Executive’s expense.

20

See Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 261,
293–97 (2013); James Hamilton et al., Taking Stock of the STOCK Act, AM. CRIM. L. REV. BLOG (Oct.
19, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/taking-stock
-stock-act-10-19-2012.
21
Hamilton et al., supra note 20.

611

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

I.

LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE IN THEORY: TO WHOM DOES THE
PRIVILEGE BELONG?

Article I, Section Six of the U.S. Constitution states:
The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.22

This Section confers both immunity upon members of Congress from arrest
arising from legislative acts and a legal privilege protecting information of
such acts from being used against members.23 This Note addresses only the
latter guarantee, known as legislative privilege, which is a product of the
concluding phrase of Section Six—the Speech or Debate Clause. The
Clause descends from a British provision,24 which by the seventeenth
century was primarily understood as a dictate underlying the separation of
powers between Parliament and the British Crown.25
With the separation of powers as one of the Clause’s primary
philosophical underpinnings,26 a split in the literature emerged over to
whom the privilege belongs: the legislature as an institution or the
individual legislator. This Part provides an overview of these two
theoretical approaches, including each approach’s understanding of the
purpose of the Clause, evidence to support that understanding, and finally,
the waiver implications that follow the two interpretations. Whether the
privilege belongs to Congress as an institution or to individual members of
22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614–15 (1972).
24
“That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169, 178 (1966) (quoting 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 1, 2 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
25
See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1123 (1973). Though the concept of parliamentary privilege originated
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it was only in 1542 that the privilege was incorporated into the
Speaker’s Petition (a recorded document that set out the relationship between Parliament and the
Crown) and understood to represent the separation of powers between Parliament and the Crown. Id. In
1689, following the Glorious Revolution and the exile of James II, a free speech guarantee for members
of Parliament was included in the newly drafted English Bill of Rights. Id. at 1133. Multiple United
States Supreme Court Justices have also detailed the inheritance of the Clause from the British. See
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 545–46 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson, 383 U.S. at
177–79.
26
See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178–79; Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate Clause: Bastion of
Congressional Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 197, 223 (1979); Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1145. But see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 91 (2007)
(proposing that the privilege is best interpreted as facilitating popular sovereignty rather than separation
of powers).
23
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Congress carries implications for the constitutionality of an institutional,
statutory waiver of such legislative privilege by Congress.
A. Legislative Privilege as an Individual Guarantee
The characterization of legislative privilege as an individual guarantee
is animated by a textual reading of Article I, early state case law, a concern
for the separation of powers, and the rights of the people. First, the
theoretical case for legislative privilege as an individual guarantee finds
support in the text of the Constitution.27 In his 1833 Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, Justice Joseph Story articulated a
distinction between rights belonging to the body (possibly such as those
contained in Article I, Section Five, which refers to “each House” when
conferring powers to the institution of Congress28) and Article I, Section
Six, which addresses “Senators and Representatives.”29 On the basis of this
textual distinction, Story concludes that Section Six’s legislative privilege
is an individual right.30 By considering the text of Article I’s various
Sections in relation to one another, Section Five’s repeated reference to the
institutions of the House and Senate builds a case for Section Six’s
privilege to be understood as an individual one, given Section Six’s
multiple references to legislators’ specific titles.31
In addition to the text of the Constitution, individual right theorists32
rely on the frequently cited Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
opinion in Coffin v. Coffin.33 As one of the first U.S. cases on record
dealing with legislative privilege,34 Coffin provides insight into the judicial
understanding of legislative privilege in the early Republic. The 1808 case
dealt with the application of Massachusetts’s state legislative privilege
provision35 in a defamation suit brought against a member of the state
27

See James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause and
Conflict of Interest Challenges to Unionization of Congressional Employees, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,
28–29 (1999).
28
See id. for the suggestion that Justice Story “stressed this distinction” between Section Five and
Section Six. Article I, Section 5 powers include the power of each House to be “the Judge of [its]
Elections, Returns and Qualifications,” “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” and “punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
29
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 847, at 317 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (cited in Brudney, supra note 27, at
28–29 & n.132).
30
STORY, supra note 29, § 847, at 317.
31
See Brudney, supra note 27, at 28–29.
32
See id. at 29; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1166.
33
4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808).
34
See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1172 n.289.
35
“The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential
to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or
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House of Representatives.36 The court held that the privilege did not belong
to the legislature as a body, but rather to each individual member, “even
against the declared will of the house.”37 The court reasoned that an
individual member of the legislature “does not hold this privilege at the
pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people . . . which is
paramount to the will of either or both branches of the legislature.”38
Therefore, the court defined the privilege as an individual privilege in the
name of executing the will of the sovereign people rather than immunizing
legislators from prosecution for their own benefit.39
The Massachusetts court placed the will of the people above, and in
this case, against, the desire of the legislative body to waive the privilege.
Justice Story’s editors later cited Coffin for this same proposition made by
Story: “these rights and privileges are in truth the rights and privileges of
[the member’s] constituents, and for their benefit and security, rather than
the rights and privileges of the member for his own benefit and security.”40
Justice Story reiterated the Massachusetts court’s reliance on the concept of
a sovereign people, and not simply the separation of powers, to justify
insulation of individual members of the Legislative Branch.41
The individual right theory has found similar support from the
academy. Professors Robert Reinstein and Harvey Silverglate, in their
seminal 1973 article on the history and development of legislative
privilege, concluded that legislative privilege is “guaranteed to each
member personally, and its constitutional protection is not subject to
collective discretion.”42 In other words, Congress as a whole cannot waive a
privilege that does not belong to it as an institution.
Professors Reinstein and Silverglate contend that in “executivemotivated suits,” the Speech or Debate Clause should be interpreted

complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXI (1780), reprinted
in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 11, 13.
36
Coffin, 4 Mass. at 1–4.
37
Id. at 27.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 850 & n.b,
at 622 (photo. reprint 1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1891); see
Melville M. Bigelow, Preface to the Fifth Edition of STORY, supra, at v (stating that “[t]he editorial
notes have been separated entirely from the notes of the author; the latter run across the page, after
numerals, the former are in double columns, after letters of the alphabet”).
41
See Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional
Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 435 (1994) (“Even those who consider the privilege to belong
to the member are emphatic that its purpose is to benefit the people rather than their representative.”).
42
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1169–70.
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broadly to serve the greater interest of separation of powers.43 They find
that “even well-meaning executive challenges” can have a chilling effect
on legislators.44 In their view, the Executive poses the primary threat to
legislative independence despite the Executive Branch’s often-sincere
underlying motives.45 Therefore, the purpose of the Speech or Debate
Clause is to preserve legislative independence by preventing Executive
encroachment.46 In order to give effect to this purpose, Professors Reinstein
and Silverglate argue that legislative privilege must be observed as an
individual guarantee.47
B. Legislative Privilege as an Institutional Guarantee
Consensus has largely coalesced around the purpose of the Speech or
Debate Clause to “protect[] the integrity of the legislative process” through
an effective separation of powers.48 To that end, Professor Craig Bradley,
whose 1979 work on the Clause is still the primary counterpoint to
Professors Reinstein and Silverglate’s work, similarly asserts that the
Clause’s basic purpose is to protect the powers of the Legislative Branch
from encroachment by the other branches.49 Among those who conceive of
legislative privilege as an institutional guarantee, this purpose is best served
by viewing members of Congress as part of the larger legislative scheme.50
Given the limited discussion of the Speech or Debate Clause at the
Constitutional Convention,51 Founding Era records from outside the
43

Id. at 1145–46. Reinstein and Silverglate, however, draw a clear distinction between the scope of
the privilege as applied to Executive-brought suits and as applied to private civil suits claiming
violations of constitutional rights. See id. at 1177 (“It would be a supreme irony if the speech or debate
privilege . . . were construed so that courts lend their assistance to the executive in breaching the wall of
separation of powers but deny relief for the violation of individual rights.”).
44
Id. at 1145–46.
45
Id. at 1145.
46
Id. at 1145–46.
47
Id. at 1169–70.
48
Ray, supra note 41, at 435.
49
Bradley, supra note 26, at 223.
50
See, e.g., Ray, supra note 41, at 435.
51
In a 1966 case dealing with legislative privilege, Justice Harlan wrote, “The Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution was approved at the Constitutional Convention without discussion and
without opposition.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966); see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 166 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). In fact, the Articles of
Confederation already contained a virtually identical clause: “Freedom of speech and debate in
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court, or place out of Congress, and the members
of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the time of their
going to and from, and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.”
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 5. Its constitutional successor was neither
questioned nor opposed at the states’ ratification debates or within the press, and three state
constitutions already included speech or debate clauses when the U.S. Constitution was drafted. See
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373–75 (1951) (quoting the privilege provisions within the 1776
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Convention provide much of the support for Professor Bradley and his
fellow proponents of the privilege as an institutional guarantee. Numerous
sources indicate that the Framers were conscious of British parliamentary
abuse of the privilege when adopting it in the United States.52 Most notably,
in an 1832 letter responding to a Virginia congressman, James Madison
wrote: “It is certain that the privilege has been abused in British
precedents.”53 He continued that when “difficulties and differences of
opinion” arise in privilege cases, “the reason and necessity of the privilege
must be the guide.”54 Thus, Madison conceived of a Clause driven by
function rather than form given the latter’s susceptibility to workarounds
and abuse.55
Thomas Jefferson had articulated his own vision of the privilege in his
1801 work, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice.56 Jefferson wrote that
“[t]he privilege of a member is the privilege of the House,” and “[p]rivilege
is in the power of the House, and is a restraint to the proceeding of inferior
courts.”57 Jefferson thus asserted the right of Congress as an institution to
make decisions as to privilege seven years before the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held nearly the opposite in Coffin v. Coffin.58
Relying in large part on Jefferson’s understanding of the privilege,
Professor Bradley concludes that the Clause “was not intended to protect
the minority in Congress” from criminalization by the majority in
Congress, but rather to protect the whole Legislative Branch from an
encroaching Executive or Judiciary.59

Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and the New Hampshire
Constitution of 1784); CHAFETZ, supra note 26, at 87–88.
52
See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972) (“The history of the privilege is by no
means free from grave abuses by legislators.”); id. at 545 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the
Parliamentary privilege was indeed abused is historical fact.”). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra
note 25, at 1139 (“[T]hat the abuses of other privileges can be imputed to the speech or debate
privilege, an argument expressed by Chief Justice Burger in Brewster, depends upon an historical
construction that is more creative than descriptive.”).
53
4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 221 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1867); see also Brewster, 408 U.S. at 546 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Madison in THE
FEDERALIST No. 48 when noting “that the Framers, aware of these abuses, were determined to guard
against them”).
54
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 53, at 221; see also Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1140 n.142.
55
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1140.
56
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § III, at 19 (1801) (cited in
Bradley, supra note 26, at 224).
57
Id. at 25–26; see Ray, supra note 41, at 434.
58
4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808) (holding that the privilege belongs to the individual member and
not the legislative house).
59
Bradley, supra note 26, at 223–24.
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C. Institutional Waiver of Legislative Privilege
The character of legislative privilege, be it individual or institutional,
ultimately determines the constitutionality of an institutional waiver of the
privilege. Such an institutional waiver would apply to a specific statute and
would not eliminate legislative privilege across the board; rather, an
institutional waiver would prohibit members of Congress from invoking
legislative privilege when charged with a crime or facing a liability created
under a specific piece of legislation. For scholars who interpret legislative
privilege as a guarantee belonging to individual members of Congress, it
follows that Congress as a body could not waive legislative privilege
through statutory action. As a result, courts cannot read congressional
intent for an implied institutional waiver into a given statute. The primary
objection is that a constitutionally guaranteed privilege of an individual
member should not be waived at the discretion of a majority or even a
supermajority.60 Professor James Brudney argues, to allow institutional
waiver would allow “a legislative majority to suppress dissent simply by
criminalizing conduct otherwise thought of as legislative.”61 In light of this
tyranny-of-the-majority argument, opponents of institutional waiver reject
the concept based on its implication that Congress, as opposed to the
courts, would “determine the scope of the constitutional privilege.”62 In
other words, a congressional decision to waive legislative privilege’s
individual guarantee may imply that Congress can interpret and limit a
constitutional provision rather than the Judicial Branch.
While a member of Congress may always choose to waive her own
privilege under the individual privilege theory, the lack of incentive to do
so reveals the individual theory as one open to wide abuse by selfinterested actors. Professors Reinstein and Silverglate concede this much,
but recognize the abuse as a necessary evil in order to preserve the greater
purpose of effective separation of powers.63 Yet the bribery case law that
has developed under the individual privilege theory has significantly
increased the opportunity for such abuse,64 and the STOCK Act merely
creates another opportunity for corruption to go unpunished in the face of
hamstrung attempts by the Executive to hold members of Congress
accountable. An institutional approach offers an alternative to this problem.

60

See Brudney, supra note 27, at 28–30; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1170.
See Brudney, supra note 27, at 29. But see supra Part I.B (discussing Professor Bradley’s
contention that the Clause’s purpose is not the protection of a minority in Congress from the majority,
but rather protection of the Legislative Branch as a whole).
62
Brudney, supra note 27, at 29; see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1170.
63
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1170 (“[I]t must be admitted that in some cases
wrongdoing may go unquestioned, uninvestigated, or unpunished . . . .”).
64
See infra Part II.
61
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An institutional understanding of legislative privilege implies that an
institutional waiver of privilege is constitutional. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly and deliberately avoided the question of whether Congress may
waive Speech or Debate Clause protection.65 If, however, the privilege is to
serve as an institutional guard against both Executive Branch encroachment
and Legislative Branch corruption, institutional waiver may be appropriate
and constitutional in certain circumstances.66 If the intent of the Framers
was to protect the legislature as a whole from encroachment by the
Executive, as Jefferson and Madison similarly imply, a statute passed by
the legislature as a whole may indeed serve as a waiver.67
Furthermore, existing safeguards may limit the potential threat that a
waiver poses to legislative independence. Institutional waiver, as
envisioned by Professors Bradley and Laura Krugman Ray, applies to a
particular statute.68 It therefore can strengthen anticorruption statutes but
would be limited to specific pieces of legislation and not eliminate
legislative privilege wholesale. An institutional waiver is further limited by
Congress’s institutional ability to repeal or amend statutes.69 If an
institutional waiver is later determined to allow the Executive to encroach
upon the independence of the Legislative Branch, Congress can simply
repeal that waiver.70 Therefore, the legislative process itself provides an
additional safeguard on the institutional waiver. In fact, one supporter of
the institutional waiver, Professor Ray, argues that in practice, bribery and
other corrupt practices have posed a more serious threat to legislative
independence than harassment by the Executive Branch.71 Ultimately, the
constitutionality of an institutional waiver will determine the ability of the
Executive to access the evidence necessary to build a case against a
member of Congress or her staff. In turn, the enforceability of the STOCK
Act depends on whether an institutional waiver is constitutional.

65

United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490–93 (1979). In Helstoski, the Court, assuming
arguendo that Congress as a body could waive the protection, found no evidence of such a waiver in the
statutory text or legislative history of the bribery statute. Id. at 492–93. See infra Part II.A.
66
See Bradley, supra note 26, at 223–25; Ray, supra note 41, at 435–36; see also David M.
Lederkramer, Note, A Statutory Proposal for Case-by-Case Congressional Waiver of the Speech or
Debate Privilege in Bribery Cases, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 465, 467, 504–10 (1982) (construing a
functional analysis of the Speech or Debate Clause that renders waiver constitutional and proposing that
Congress as a body pass special legislation waiving legislative privilege after the initiation of a specific
case against a member of Congress).
67
Bradley, supra note 26, at 223–25.
68
See id. at 223; Ray, supra note 41, at 436.
69
See Ray, supra note 41, at 436.
70
See id.
71
Id. at 432.
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II. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
The D.C. Circuit’s 2007 decision in United States v. Rayburn House
Office Building72 revealed a new discord between the understanding of
legislative privilege as an individual guarantee and the Speech or Debate
Clause’s function within the separation of powers. Rayburn succeeds a line
of twentieth-century Supreme Court bribery cases that defined the contours
of legislative privilege in the face of the federal bribery statute.
The twentieth-century bribery cases struggled to balance the privilege
with corruption charges based on a federal statute, but Rayburn wholly
embraced legislative privilege in the bribery context. Rayburn expanded
the idea of privilege to permit withholding materials pertaining to
legislative acts from the Executive Branch in a criminal investigation.73 The
doctrine illustrates the progression of the Clause from a privilege that
coexisted with anticorruption statutes to Rayburn’s full-throttled
construction of legislative privilege as an absolute and powerful individual
guarantee. The first step in understanding this doctrine is an examination of
the bribery statute case law. Then, a look at Rayburn, what it means for the
D.C. Circuit, and how Congress views it allows for an understanding of the
environment into which the STOCK Act was born.
A. Bribery
Some of the Supreme Court’s most significant legislative privilege
jurisprudence developed in reference to the federal bribery statute. Though
one of the first post-Ratification laws that Congress adopted dealt with
bribery of public officials, Congress did not subject its own members to the
sanctions of a bribery statute until 1853.74 The Act of February 26, 185375
72

497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 662–63.
74
PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
3–4 (2011).
75
The text of the Act states:
73

And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, promise,
offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money, goods, right in
action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security
for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or
any other valuable thing whatever, to any member of the Senate or House of Representatives of
the United States, . . . with intent to influence his vote or decision on any question, matter,
cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or may by law, or under the Constitution of
the United States, be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or
profit, . . . such person . . . and the member, officer, or person who shall in anywise accept or
receive the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to indictment as for a high crime and
misdemeanor in any court of the United States having jurisdiction for the trial of crimes and
misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding three times the
amount so offered, promised, or given, and imprisoned in a penitentiary not exceeding three
years; and the person convicted of so accepting or receiving the same, or any part thereof, if an
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criminalized both the offer of a bribe to any federal officer and the
acceptance of a bribe by a federal officer.76 Furthermore, the statute
explicitly conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts over charges against
members of Congress.77 The congressional record is silent on the
applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause to the Act,78 and multiple
scholars have reasonably understood this silence to mean that legislative
privilege was not considered at the Act’s passage.79 A century later,
Congress consolidated the various bribery statutes under 18 U.S.C. § 201.80
The Senate report accompanying the bill made clear that the reorganization
and consolidation of the statutes “would not restrict the broad scope of the
present bribery statutes as construed by the courts.”81 Therefore,
assumptions about privilege under the 1853 statute carried through to
§ 201.
One of the first modern cases to consider whether legislative privilege
may obviate a criminal statute did not involve bribery. The 1966 Supreme
Court case of United States v. Johnson involved conspiracy and conflict of
interest statutes rather than the bribery statute.82 Yet, Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court in Johnson, laid the foundation for evaluation of the bribery
statute and future statutory delegations of prosecutorial authority over
members of Congress.83 The Court held that because the Government’s
conspiracy prosecution of a congressman was based on his House floor
speech—an inherently “legislative act[]”—and the motives behind the
speech, it violated the Speech or Debate Clause.84 The Court, however, was
officer or person holding any such place of trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or
place; and any person so convicted under this section shall forever be disqualified to hold any
office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States.
Ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 170, 171.
76
Id.; Ray, supra note 41, at 418.
77
See Ray, supra note 41, at 418 & n.149.
78
CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 288–97 (1853).
79
See Bradley, supra note 26, at 225 n.166; Ray, supra note 41, at 418–19 & nn.149–51; Note, The
Bribed Congressman’s Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 341 n.40 (1965). Similarly,
Chief Justice Burger cited to the lack of discussion of the Speech or Debate Clause during debates of
the Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 180, 12 Stat. 577, which prohibited a member of Congress from accepting
anything of value in exchange for procurement of government contract. The Act was later incorporated
into 18 U.S.C. § 201, and Chief Justice Burger used the lack of legislative history to conclude that there
is no evidence of an institutional waiver of legislative privilege in § 201. United States v. Helstoski, 442
U.S. 477, 493 & n.8 (1979).
80
HENNING & RADEK, supra note 74, at 16; see Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (1962) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1964)).
81
S. REP. NO. 87-2213, at 4 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852; HENNING & RADEK,
supra note 74, at 16.
82
383 U.S. 169, 170–71 (1966).
83
See id. at 185.
84
Id. at 184–85.
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careful not to foreclose all criminal prosecutions based on legislative acts.85
Instead, the Court left “open for consideration” the prohibitive nature of
legislative privilege when it pertained to a statute that was “narrowly
drawn . . . in the exercise of [Congress’s] legislative power to regulate the
conduct of its members.”86 It remained to be seen whether § 201 was
sufficiently narrow.
In 1972, the Supreme Court reviewed the United States’ case against
Senator Daniel Brewster, who had accepted a bribe in exchange for his vote
on postage-rate legislation.87 In United States v. Brewster, the Court
concluded that the illegal act in the case of bribery was the acceptance of
the bribe and not the legislative act performed in fulfillment of the bribe,
i.e., Senator Brewster’s vote.88 Therefore, the Court found that an
examination of whether § 201 was sufficiently narrow was not of great
import, and the Speech or Debate Clause did not prohibit a bribery
prosecution.89
In the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger distinguished the
Speech or Debate Clause from its British predecessor, noting, “Our speech
or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative independence, not
supremacy.”90 With the separation of powers as its principled basis, the
Court attempted to balance the “remote” possibility of abuse of Executive
investigatory and prosecutorial power with the danger of living in a world
with no statute prohibiting members of Congress from accepting bribes.91
The Court, finding appropriate the delegations of power to the Executive to
investigate and prosecute members of Congress, referenced Congress’s
limited ability to self-police matters such as bribery given members’
“disinclination” to do so.92 Though Congress is constitutionally designed to
discipline its own members under its Article I, Section 5 authority,
Professor Ray has found that “neither branch of Congress has . . . compiled
an exemplary record of self-discipline.”93
In recognizing that § 201 was an appropriate delegation of power and
therefore constitutionally subjected members of Congress to possible
prosecution, the Court maintained that no such prosecution could be made

85

Id. at 185.
Id.
87
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 502–03 (1972).
88
Id. at 526.
89
Id. at 510, 528–29.
90
Id. at 508.
91
Id. at 524.
92
Id. at 525.
93
Ray, supra note 41, at 408. For a discussion about the limits of congressional self-policing
through internal discipline, see id. at 408–18.
86
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on the basis of an inquiry into legislative acts.94 Thus a distinct space was
made for application of the Speech or Debate Clause’s legislative privilege:
it was not so broad as to protect corrupt members of Congress who would
in turn corrupt the legislative process, but it was not so narrow as to
threaten the independence of the Legislative Branch.95
Seven years later, in United States v. Helstoski, the Court concluded
that mere passage of the bribery statute did not constitute a blanket waiver
of members’ Speech or Debate Clause protection.96 The Government
charged Henry Helstoski, a former congressman, with conspiracy to violate
the bribery statute when he accepted bribes from alien residents in
exchange for introducing private bills that would allow them to avoid
deportation.97 The Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause prevented
the Government from admitting evidence of past legislative acts, such as
introduction of the bills, to establish its case against Helstoski.98
Taking a cue from Johnson and Brewster, the Court declined to decide
whether a member of Congress could be prosecuted for a distinctly
legislative act under a narrowly tailored policing statute.99 Rather, it made
clear that mere enactment of § 201 “does not amount to a congressional
waiver of the protection of the Clause for individual Members.”100 The
Court acknowledged potential problems with an institutional waiver of
legislative privilege through statutory enactment.101 The Court cited both
logic and case law to illustrate the plausible argument against such a
waiver. Logically speaking, the Court recognized the argument that
Congress, as a body, might not be able to deprive individual members of
their constitutionally guaranteed privilege.102 For case law, the Court cited
Coffin v. Coffin and United States v. Brewster, which both found that the
privilege operated as an individual guarantee, not an institutional one.103
Nevertheless, Justice Burger took the time to rule out the possibility
that an institutional waiver existed within the bribery statute. Writing for
the Court, he noted, “Assuming, arguendo, that the Congress could
94

Brewster, 408 U.S. at 510.
See id. at 525. “Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read broadly to effectuate its
purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no more than the statutes we
apply, was its purpose to make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal
responsibility.” Id. at 516.
96
442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979).
97
Id. at 479.
98
Id. at 489.
99
Id. at 492.
100
Id.
101
See id. at 490–93.
102
Id. at 492–93.
103
Id. at 493.
95
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constitutionally waive the protection of the Clause for individual Members,
such waiver could be shown only by an explicit and unequivocal
expression.”104 The Court looked to the language and legislative history of
both § 201 and its predecessor acts105 to rule out the possibility of such an
expression.106 Ultimately, the Court declined to conclude whether such a
waiver could constitutionally exist.107 In doing so, the Court allowed for the
possibility of an institutional waiver in a future statute,108 though it did not
find one in this case.109
After Brewster and Helstoski, § 201 appropriately applies to members
of Congress but not to the extent that it vitiates their protection under the
Speech or Debate Clause. Hints of both understandings of legislative
privilege—institutional and individual—exist in the case law, and the D.C.
Circuit’s subsequent decision in Rayburn only serves to further complicate
the Speech or Debate Clause doctrine.
B. United States v. Rayburn House Office Building and the
Nondisclosure Privilege
On a Saturday night in May 2006, more than a dozen FBI agents
searched through paper and electronic documents in the Capitol Hill office
of U.S. Representative William Jefferson.110 The agents entered the
Rayburn office on suspicion that Representative Jefferson and others had
sought and accepted consideration in certain business ventures in exchange
for the execution of official acts.111 Four days after the search, then-Speaker
of the House J. Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi issued a
“rare”112 joint statement condemning the search:
The Justice Department was wrong to seize records from Congressman
Jefferson’s office in violation of the Constitutional principle of Separation of
104

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
106
Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 493 & n.8.
107
Id. at 493.
108
Though not dealing with the bribery statute, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the
Court presumed that Congress would not “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history” as
legislative privilege “by covert inclusion” in the general language of a statute. Id. at 376. The Court
appears to have approached the suggestion of an implied waiver as one that need overcome the
rebuttable presumption against it. However, the Court in Tenney nowhere stated that a waiver, implicit
or explicit, was unconstitutional. Thus, Justice Burger’s inquiry into such a waiver in Helstoski was not
an abnormal one.
109
Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 492.
110
Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Contends Lawmaker Hid Bribe in Freezer, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at
A1; see also Carl Hulse, House Leaders Demand Return of Seized Files, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at
A1.
111
United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
112
Hulse, supra note 110.
105
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Powers, the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, and the practice of
the last 219 years. These constitutional principles were not designed by the
Founding Fathers to place anyone above the law. Rather, they were designed
to protect the Congress and the American people from abuses of power, and
those principles deserve to be vigorously defended.113

The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed. The court held that
compelled disclosure of documents relating to legislative acts would
constitute a distraction from the legislative process and a violation of the
Speech or Debate Clause.114 Ultimately, the court interpreted legislative
privilege broadly to permit nondisclosure of covered materials to the
Executive Branch or any of its agents, even in a criminal investigation.115
The Government sought a writ of certiorari in Rayburn, but the
Supreme Court denied the petition.116 The denial came in spite of the
petition’s obvious yet worthwhile warning that the D.C. Circuit’s decision,
if left undisturbed, will play a unique and primary role in Congress’s
understanding of the reach of Speech or Debate Clause protections given
the geographic location of the Capitol.117 As the Government understood
the law, the extension of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn could
potentially “impede searches of Members’ homes, vehicles, or briefcases”
and not merely prohibit the “concededly extraordinary event” of searching
a member’s Capitol Hill office.118 Consequently, Rayburn expanded the
individual guarantee that the Supreme Court had established in its bribery
cases, and significantly shifted the balance in a corruption prosecution in
favor of the legislator–defendant.
In Rayburn, the D.C. Circuit did not directly address the criminal
statutes in play because the issue was not whether the statute applied but
what evidence may be collected. The reaction of those affected by the
decision, however, lends institutional insight into how Congress
understood the relevant statutes to operate. The joint statement by Pelosi
and Hastert made clear that the leaders of both parties in the House
opposed the steps taken by the Executive as an encroachment on the
113

Press Release, Joint Statement from Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Pelosi (May 24,
2006), available at Lynn Sweet, Hastert, Pelosi Issue Rare Joint Statement: They Blast FBI Raid on
House Member, CHI. SUN-TIMES BLOG (May 24, 2006, 2:10 PM), http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/
2006/05/hastert_pelosi_issue_rare_join.html.
114
Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 656, 660.
115
Id. at 662–63.
116
Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1295 (2008).
117
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Rayburn House Office Bldg., 552 U.S. 1295 (No. 07-816),
2007 WL 4458912, at *11 (“Investigations designed to ferret out congressional corruption (such as
bribery) find their nerve center in the Nation’s capital. Because of that fact, decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have a uniquely important role in defining
the Constitution’s express protection for legislators: the Speech or Debate Clause.”).
118
Id. at 12, 2007 WL 4458912 at *12.
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independence of the Legislative Branch.119 But their statement should not
be read as congressional absolution of Jefferson’s sins. Rather, Pelosi
encouraged Jefferson to give up his seat on the powerful House Ways and
Means Committee, and both Pelosi and Hastert urged Jefferson to
cooperate with the Justice Department’s investigation once the privileged
documents were returned.120
In addition to the party leaders’ statements, a group of former highranking congressional staffers filed an amici curiae brief in opposition to
the Government’s petition for certiorari.121 The brief makes clear that its
aim is not the protection of Jefferson but rather the preservation of the
independence of the Legislative Branch.122 The press release and the amici
brief illustrate that the Executive Branch exceeded what Congress as an
institution, represented by its leadership, understood to be limits on its
delegation of the prosecutorial and investigatory function.
Four years later, the Supreme Court similarly denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari, this time on behalf of former U.S. Representative Richard
Renzi of Arizona.123 In United States v. Renzi, the Ninth Circuit expressly
disagreed with the holding of the D.C. Circuit in Rayburn and its broad
nondisclosure privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause.124 The Supreme
Court chose not to take the case, and the split between the circuits125 was
not resolved.126 Consequently, Rayburn remains settled law in the District
of Columbia.
119

Hulse, supra note 110.
Id.
121
Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1–4, Rayburn House Office Bldg., 552 U.S.
1295 (No. 07-816), 2008 WL 534800, at *1–4. The brief’s authors include the former Chief of Staff and
the former Director of Floor Operations to then-House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, the former Chief of
Staff to House Minority Whip Steny H. Hoyer, the former counsel to Representative F. James
Sensenbrenner, and the former Counsel to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Id. at 2–4,
2008 WL 534800 at *2–4.
122
Id. at 4, 2008 WL 534800 at *4.
123
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
124
Id. at 1037–39.
125
It is critical to note that the Government, in its brief in opposition to Renzi’s petition, went out
of its way to clarify that the question at issue in Renzi was not one of whether a legislative privilege to
nondisclosure exists. The Government attempted to argue that the dispositive question was whether a
nondisclosure privilege would entitle a legislator to a hearing to determine if the privileged evidence
was used to procure nonprivileged evidence. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 13–22, Renzi,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (No. 11-557), 2011 WL 6370518, at *13–22.
126
Denial of certiorari in Renzi without additional guidance from the Supreme Court should not be
interpreted as Supreme Court approval of the decision in Rayburn. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,
226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The significance of a denial of a petition for certiorari ought
no longer to require discussion. This Court has said again and again and again that such a denial has no
legal significance whatever bearing on the merits of the claim. The denial means that this Court has
refused to take the case. It means nothing else.”). For a discussion of the merits of the decisions, see, for
example, Emily E. Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of Powers: Are Internal
120
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III. THE STOP TRADING ON CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE
(STOCK) ACT
Rayburn’s hyperindividual guarantee created an arbitrage opportunity
for Congress: it enabled Congress to pass politically popular laws that
delegate enforcement to another branch, even though enforcement of the
laws practically could never be carried out. After the Supreme Court
declined to consider the most viable attempt to disturb Rayburn’s hold on
the D.C. Circuit by denying certiorari in Renzi, legislative privilege theory
and doctrine essentially collided. When the dust cleared, Congress passed
the STOCK Act.
In light of legislative privilege’s theory and doctrine, the STOCK Act
presented an opportunity for Congress to receive an essentially risk-free
political gain by delegating a criminal enforcement power to the Executive.
The Executive is expected to expend manpower and resources to carry out
its duty to enforce the law only to meet the legislative privilege roadblock
when the time comes to gather the evidence necessary to successfully
prosecute or pursue civil charges under the Act. In other words, Congress
could potentially game the system at the expense of the Executive Branch
in large part because of Rayburn’s nondisclosure privilege. This Part first
looks to the STOCK Act’s legislative history to determine its purported
goals and the extent to which Congress understood the limitations placed
on the Act by legislative privilege at the Act’s passage. Then, this Part
examines the arbitrage opportunity created by the confluence of theory,
doctrine, and the STOCK Act.
A. STOCK Act Legislative History
In 2006, amidst news reports of the dubious stock dealings of Tony
Rudy, chief of staff to former Representative Tom Delay,127
Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595 (2007); A.J.
Green, Note, United States v. Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or Debate Clause to Fight Corruption in
Congress Post-Rayburn, 2012 BYU L. REV. 493; Harrell, supra note 15; John P. Moore, Comment, In
Search of Congress: Why an Executive Branch Search of a Congressional Office Violates the Speech or
Debate Clause and How Congress Should Respond, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 253 (2007); John D. Pingel,
Note, Do Congressmen Still Pay Parking Tickets? The D.C. Circuit’s Overextension of Legislative
Privilege in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621 (2009); John
C. Raffetto, Note, Balancing the Legislative Shield: The Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 883 (2010); and Brian Reimels, Note, United States v. Rayburn House Office
Building, Room 2113: A Midnight Raid on the Constitution or Business as Usual?, 57 CATH. U. L.
REV. 293 (2008).
127
The reports detail Rudy’s trading of hundreds of stocks from his government computer between
1999 and 2000 and question whether his trades were based on disclosed information or material,
nonpublic information. See Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for
Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 203–04 (2009); Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading
by Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1; President Obama Praises
Slaughter, supra note 1.
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Representatives Louise Slaughter and Brian Baird of Washington
introduced the STOCK Act.128 The STOCK Act, as originally introduced,
prohibited members of Congress and their staff from trading securities
based on knowledge obtained because of their status.129 While the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates insider trading
pursuant to its authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Congress never defined insider trading as an offense in the Exchange
Act.130 Rather, an internally promulgated SEC rule, Rule 10b-5,131 serves to
prohibit fraud and calls for violations to either be punished as civil offenses
by the SEC or prosecuted as crimes by the Department of Justice.132 While
there are debates as to whether congressional insider trading was already
strictly prohibited under the SEC rule,133 observers have documented the
SEC’s blind eye towards congressional insider trading.134 In fact, two years
before the reports of Rudy’s dealings were published, an academic study
found that the stock portfolios of U.S. senators bested the market average
by 97 basis points (or nearly 1%) per month.135 And the Rudy scandal was
just one of several that created a call for at-large congressional ethics
reform.136 However, the STOCK Act did not gain real momentum in
Congress until after the airing of the 60 Minutes report in November
2011.137
By the fall of 2011, congressional approval ratings had fallen to
13%.138 The Occupy Wall Street movement, which had drawn attention to
the inequities between the middle class and the wealthy few—personified
by Wall Street bankers—had an approval rating of more than double that of

128

President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1.
Id.
130
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Enforcement, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 1105, 1109–10 (2011).
131
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided the SEC with authority to
promulgate Rule 10b-5. In turn, 10b-5 prohibits insider trading. 10b-5 sets the parameters on the SEC
and Department of Justice’s enforcement authority. See id.
132
Id.
133
Compare id. at 1111 (“[T]he current law . . . works as well for congressional officials as it does
for every other person who trades securities in our capital markets.”), with Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 297 (2011) (“As to members of Congress, . . .
current law provides a strong argument that their trading cannot be punished under either the classic
disclose or abstain or the misappropriation theory.”).
134
Bainbridge, supra note 133, at 303, 307.
135
Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S.
Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 675 (2004); see Nagy, supra note 130, at 1106.
136
Barbabella et al., supra note 127, at 202–05.
137
See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
138
Jeffrey M. Jones, Congressional Job Approval Essentially Flat at 12%, GALLUP POL. (Mar. 21,
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153377/congressional-job-approval-essentially-flat.aspx.
129
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Congress.139 Then, in January 2012, as President Obama was preparing to
run for reelection, he announced in his State of the Union address: “Send
me a bill that bans insider trading by Members of Congress, and I will sign
it tomorrow.”140 By March 2012, right before the 112th Congress passed the
STOCK Act, approval ratings remained at a dismal 12%.141 Public opinion
and the political climate were ripe for passage of the STOCK Act. The bill
passed in the Senate by a margin of 96 to 3, in the House, 417 to 2.142
1. STOCK Act Provisions.—The heart of the STOCK Act is its
prohibition on congressional insider trading.143 The prohibition affirms that
members and congressional employees are not exempt from the Exchange
Act’s regulation of insider trading.144 Significantly, the prohibition
recognizes that members and congressional employees have an affirmative
duty to the institution of Congress, the United States Government, and the
citizens of the United States with regard “to material, nonpublic
information derived from such person’s position.”145 The duty is asserted on
the basis of the “trust and confidence owed by each Member of Congress
and each employee of Congress.”146
The “trust and confidence” language was not in the original text of the
bill.147 It was added as a result of concerns expressed in the bill’s committee
hearings and markup in order to “remove any uncertainty about the
prohibition on insider trading.”148 According to Senator Carl Levin of
Michigan, “[e]stablishing such a duty removes any doubt as to whether
insider trading prohibitions apply to Congress.”149 If, as Senator Levin has
stated, the trust and confidence language serves to “reassure[] the American
people that there are no barriers to prosecuting Members and employees of
Congress for insider trading,”150 does a duty of trust and confidence owed
to the American populace vitiate legislative privilege?
139
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2. Congressional Knowledge at STOCK Act Passage.—In United
States v. Helstoski, the Supreme Court, assuming the constitutionality of an
institutional waiver, found that 18 U.S.C. § 201 (the federal bribery statute)
did not constitute a waiver of legislative privilege on the basis of its
legislative history and the text of the statute.151 In the absence of a waiver in
the statute’s text, Congress’s understanding of the role of legislative
privilege in a STOCK Act prosecution is critical to determine whether the
Act was meant to include a waiver.
As detailed above, Senator Levin attributed the addition of the trust
and confidence language to concerns expressed in committee hearings and
bill markup.152 The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, on which Senator Levin sits, held a hearing on the
STOCK Act on December 1, 2011. Of the nonmember witnesses, all five
referenced Speech or Debate Clause concerns in their testimony.153 For
example, attorney Robert L. Walker warned “not to minimize the potential
practical difficulties of proving an insider case in Congress, [because] proof
in some such cases could be impeded by Speech or Debate Clause
concerns.”154 In the same vein, the written testimony of Melanie Sloan,
Executive Director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington, stated that the Clause “will have a bearing on the ability of
prosecutors to bring charges against members of Congress who trade on
information obtained through their positions as legislators.”155 The
transcript of the hearing reflects that Ms. Sloan brought up the issue again
in an exchange with Senator Mark Begich, when she said, “[T]he Speech or
Debate Clause . . . would not allow prosecution in an awful lot of these
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cases,” and then recommended utilizing both Houses’ ethics committees to
punish members insulated by the Clause.156
Multiple members of the Senate panel also weighed in on the potential
obstacle posed by the Speech or Debate Clause to effective enforcement.
Among the senators, Senator Joseph Lieberman—Chairman of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs—followed up
with Ms. Sloan and asked for specific recommendations for how to provide
the Ethics Committees with jurisdiction to handle insider trading matters.157
Similarly, the House Committee on Financial Services also debated the
challenges posed to STOCK Act enforcement by the Speech or Debate
Clause. At several points during the December 6, 2011 House hearing,
members of Congress and witnesses alike recognized the potential for
Speech or Debate Clause obstruction.158 Arguably the strongest statement
came from Representative Barney Frank who stated, “The narrower the
[Speech or Debate Clause] is used, the better it will be. People should not
be prosecuted for things they say on the Floor, for libel or for other reasons,
but the [Speech or Debate Clause] should not be a shield here.”159
It is unclear if these specific cautions were on the mind of Senator
Levin when he identified the addition of the trust and confidence duty as a
means to upend any potential barriers to prosecution under the Act. The
Senate hearing’s witness testimony included a discussion of the failure to
create a positive duty as a potential downfall of the Act.160 The addition of
the trust and confidence duty may therefore be understood as merely
targeting the witnesses’ technical concerns that the bill include a duty
analogous to the duty (such as a fiduciary duty) breached in traditional
insider trading cases and not their Speech or Debate Clause concerns. In
either case, the Senator’s statement unequivocally asserted “that there are
no barriers to prosecuti[on].”161
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Committee hearings and floor statements are not the only tools for
insight into Congress’s view of legislative privilege at the time it passed the
STOCK Act. For instance, on December 2, 2011—one day after the Senate
Committee hearing162—the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S.
House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of Representative
Renzi’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.163 The Group’s
members included Speaker of the House John Boehner, Majority Leader
Eric Cantor, Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy, Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi, and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer.164 The brief argued that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Renzi threatened the protected privilege of
nondisclosure under Rayburn.165 This indicates that the same congressional
leaders that voted for passage of the STOCK Act had distinct knowledge of
the Rayburn holding and understood the threat posed to it should the
Supreme Court grant certiorari and then uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Renzi.
Agency input from the beginning of 2012 is also telling. At a February
breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor, then-SEC Chairwoman
Mary Schapiro spoke publicly about the STOCK Act as a positive tool for
SEC enforcement, but forecasted potential difficulties with enforcement
due to the Speech or Debate Clause.166 Of the potential roadblock the SEC
would face as a result of the Speech or Debate Clause, Schapiro said,
“That’s the Constitution. We can’t ask Congress to fix that.”167
B. An Opportunity for Arbitrage
If legislative privilege renders the STOCK Act unenforceable, how is
it different from any other ineffective law that Congress may pass?
Consider the following hypothetical168: The 112th Congress, feeling
political pressure from a populace reeling during an economic downturn,
passes a law diminishing the salary of its members. The language of the act
suggests immediate implementation. The passage of the law is universally
well received, but immediate implementation is undoubtedly
unconstitutional given the Twenty-Seventh Amendment’s requirement that
“[n]o law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and
162
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Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall
have intervened.”169 In effect, Congress passed an ineffective law for a
short-term political gain that posed no real threat to its ranks. While
offensive in its pandering,170 the passage of the law does not delegate a new
task to a separate branch.
Now consider the STOCK Act, passed in 2012 with broad bipartisan
support. The STOCK Act does not appear, on its face, unconstitutional. It
merely delegates authority to the Executive to prosecute members of
Congress for insider trading. However, if the Speech or Debate Clause
renders a STOCK Act prosecution or civil proceeding unwinnable, the
Executive has nevertheless expended time and resources in its pursuit. All
the while, Congress still reaps the political gain from passage of the Act. In
effect, Congress as an institution positions the Executive Branch against the
individual right interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause. By
delegating authority to the Executive Branch, whether well-intentioned or
otherwise, the STOCK Act creates a potential problem for the separation of
powers.
In order to determine whether the STOCK Act represents
congressional arbitrage, a more thorough examination of the Act’s teeth in
light of the Speech or Debate Clause is necessary. Some scholars have
concluded that the Clause would not pose a hindrance to STOCK Act
prosecution given the Supreme Court’s treatment of previous informationsharing acts—such as publishing information in a press release171—as
nonlegislative acts that are therefore not protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause.172 From this, the scholars conclude that if the conveyance of
information to third parties is not central to the deliberative process, then
personal use of information, or the actual trading, “would be even less
related to the legislative process.”173 This argument recalls the distinction
made in United States v. Brewster between the acceptance of the bribe (a
nonlegislative, criminal act) and the performance of the promise (in the
case of Brewster, the vote for postage-rate legislation, an inherently
legislative act).174 One scholar cites directly to Brewster to conclude that
169
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“[j]ust as the Speech [or] Debate Clause does not prohibit members of
Congress from being prosecuted for accepting bribes, it should not bar
regulation of congressional insider trading.”175 These sources, however, do
not consider the role of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn.176
The flaw in this argument is the failure to consider the evidence
necessary to build a case for insider trading.177 In Brewster, which dealt
with the bribery statute, the acceptance of the bribe was both the crime and
the key evidentiary component of the prosecution, while the legislative act
was merely an action taken in furtherance of the bribe.178 Dissimilarly, in an
insider trading case, the actual trading and breach of duty is the crime, but
the key evidentiary component is the exchange of material, nonpublic
information. The exchange of information, however, is not inherently
criminal.179
Thus, while the actual trading may not be a privileged activity, the
material, nonpublic information was likely received through a legislative
act, such as a constituent meeting or a closed-door committee hearing. The
Supreme Court has treated committee work as a legislative act for the
purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause,180 and courts and commentators
have long construed a broad application of the privilege to locations and
functions beyond speeches on the House or Senate floor.181 In 1808’s Coffin
v. Coffin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that legislative
privilege “ought not to be construed strictly” when the court refused to
limit the privilege’s application merely to speech delivered on the floor of a
legislative chamber.182 Meanwhile, Justice Story found that the “privilege is
strictly confined to things done in the course of parliamentary proceedings,
and does not cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty.”183 Yet,
Justice Story’s editors later attached a critical footnote following “place” to
indicate that a place of duty “includes committee rooms and all authorized
places of meeting.”184 Given the broad definition of a legislative act,
175

Bainbridge, supra note 133, at 303 (footnote omitted) (citing Barbabella et al., supra note 127,

at 219).
176

On the other hand, several of the scholars who have considered the Speech or Debate Clause as
a potential threat to STOCK Act enforcement have at least cited Rayburn to support their conclusions.
See Nagy, supra note 130, at 1135 n.177; Hamilton et al., supra note 20, at nn.39 & 79.
177
Hamilton et al., supra note 20; see also Brachman, supra note 20, at 293–97.
178
See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526.
179
See Brachman, supra note 20, at 293–97.
180
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377–79 (1951) (holding that the Speech or Debate
Clause applied to a congressional committee investigation).
181
See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Congressional Searches and Seizures: The Place of Legislative
Privilege, 24 J.L. & POL. 271 (2008).
182
4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808).
183
STORY, supra note 29, § 863, at 329.
184
STORY, supra note 40, § 866 n.a, at 630.

633

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Rayburn’s nondisclosure privilege creates a considerable, if not complete,
obstacle to gathering evidence of the exchange of material, nonpublic
information.
In practice, this translates to depriving the Executive “of its
investigative and prosecutorial power under Rayburn because it makes
judicial search warrants practically ineffective by requiring a
congressman’s consent to execute the search.”185 In a post-Rayburn world,
the nondisclosure privilege recognized by the D.C. Circuit poses a
significant hindrance to the SEC or the Justice Department in an effort to
obtain relevant evidence in a STOCK Act proceeding, but not before the
Executive will have expended time, manpower, and resources to bring a
case in the first place.
The post-Rayburn environment created an arbitrage opportunity out of
which the STOCK Act was passed. Whether or not Congress intended to
game the system, the effect of the Act’s passage without waiver will game
the system. It will leverage Rayburn’s near-bulletproof individual
guarantee of legislative privilege against an institutional delegation of
prosecutorial authority understood to apply to all of Congress, and it will
use the Executive Branch to do so. In United States v. Helstoski, the Court
noted that excluding the Government’s evidence on the basis of the Speech
or Debate Clause would “without doubt . . . make prosecutions more
difficult,” but allowed the exclusion anyway.186 Would the Court have so
decided if doing so made some prosecutions virtually impossible?
IV. AN INSTITUTIONAL WAIVER FOR THE STOCK ACT
Given the STOCK Act’s arbitrage opportunity, a move toward an
institutional interpretation of legislative privilege would restore an
appropriate balance to the separation of powers. An institutional
interpretation would remedy the separation of powers conflict that came to
life in the STOCK Act by allowing for an institutional waiver of privilege.
A waiver, in turn, would ease the tension between the Speech or Debate
Clause’s purpose of preserving the separation of powers and the extreme
individual interpretation of legislative privilege by the D.C. Circuit as
articulated in Rayburn.
An overextension of the individual theory is problematic whether
Congress had good intentions or not when delegating prosecutorial
185
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authority to the Executive through the STOCK Act. First, the individual
theory creates a problem for a Congress intent on holding its offending
members accountable. By treating legislative privilege as a purely
individual guarantee, the intent of Congress and those it represents is
obviated in the name of legislative privilege—a difficult proposition to
square with Coffin v. Coffin and Justice Story’s construction of legislative
privilege as a function of popular sovereignty.187
A legal landscape that only conceives of the individual right all but
eliminates the possibility of the STOCK Act fulfilling the purpose ascribed
to it by a well-intentioned Congress. Because the implication of the
individual theory is that Congress cannot waive legislative privilege on
behalf of its members,188 it essentially throws the baby out with the
bathwater: the baby being popular will, accountability, and an effective
legislative process, and the bathwater being fear of encroachment by an
Executive Branch forged in the shadow of King George III.
On the other hand, a cynic’s Congress might have intentionally
leveraged legislative privilege against its own statute to hold its members
accountable, while using the Executive for its own political gain. The
individual right interpretation allows this depiction of an ill-intentioned
Congress to succeed. It would simultaneously threaten the separation of
powers and decimate Congress’s political accountability. Therefore, the
individual theory does not allow for effective handling of a STOCK Act
passed by either a well-intentioned or ill-intentioned Congress.
An institutional approach in the case of the STOCK Act, however, will
balance the scales in the wake of Rayburn. By allowing Congress to waive
legislative privilege in a particular act, the institutional approach will
maintain an effective balance of powers between the branches by
protecting the Executive from potential legislative gaming. In Helstoski, the
Supreme Court held that the federal bribery statute did not constitute an
institutional waiver of legislative privilege.189 Assuming arguendo that such
a waiver was constitutional, the Court concluded that a “waiver could be
shown only by an explicit and unequivocal expression,” and “[t]here is no
evidence of such a waiver in the language or the legislative history” of the
bribery statute.190 Helstoski therefore left the door open for an institutional
waiver, and the STOCK Act now proves it necessary.
The best case scenario for a waiver would entail a congressional
amendment of the STOCK Act to include a clear statement waiving Speech
or Debate Clause privileges of members and congressional staff prosecuted
187
188
189
190
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under the Act. In lieu of a legislative amendment to the Act, a court may
recognize waiver within the Act under the Helstoski framework, utilizing
an institutional approach to privilege. If a court were to read in waiver to
the STOCK Act, it would have to comply with the Helstoski requirement
that any such waiver be an “explicit and unequivocal expression,”191 despite
the fact that the text of the STOCK Act nowhere states that members of
Congress hereby waive the application of their Speech or Debate Clause
privileges.192 As Professor Bradley suggested in reference to the bribery
statute, a court may first look to the statute’s express inclusion of members
of Congress within its scope.193 The STOCK Act states specifically,
“Members of Congress and employees of Congress are not exempt from
the insider trading prohibitions arising under the securities laws, including
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5
thereunder.”194 The inclusion of members of Congress within the Act’s
intentional scope is certainly explicit and unequivocal.
Furthermore, the Helstoski Court concluded that there was no
unequivocal waiver based on the lack of evidence of such a waiver in the
language or legislative history of the bribery statute.195 The same cannot be
said for the STOCK Act. The duty imposed on members based on the “trust
and confidence” owed to the Congress as an institution and to the
American people signals a binding institutional promise, backed by the
weight of law (and SEC and Justice Department enforcement).196 As
Senator Levin stated, this language was intended to respond to concerns
raised in hearings and bill markup in order to “reassure[] the American
people that there are no barriers to prosecuting Members and employees of
Congress for insider trading.”197 Given the extensive discussion of
legislative privilege in both the Senate and House hearings, one could
reasonably conclude this language—intended to destroy all barriers to
prosecution—expresses a strong willingness of Congress to forgo its right
to legislative privilege in light of its duty to both the institution of Congress
and the American people.
Several factors, however, suggest that Congress did not intend to
institutionally waive legislative privilege when passing the STOCK Act.
These factors include members’ unflagging defense of the expanded
privilege under Rayburn as evidenced by the Pelosi–Hastert joint
191
192
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statement,198 the high-ranking staffers’ amici brief in opposition to the
Government’s petition for certiorari in Rayburn,199 and the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group’s amicus brief in support of Representative Renzi’s
petition for certiorari.200 A court may treat those statements as the
understanding of legislative privilege that Congress would have had at the
time of STOCK Act passage—that legislative privilege includes a
nondisclosure privilege under Rayburn in the District of Columbia—and as
the rule against which Congress expected the STOCK Act to be enforced.
Alternatively, members’ awareness of legislative privilege could also play
in favor of waiver. These same statements establish the knowledge that
Congress possessed when it nevertheless adopted the unequivocal language
pertaining to the Act’s scope and purpose.
The arbitrage opportunity created by the STOCK Act’s passage calls
for a reexamination of the individual guarantee interpretation of legislative
privilege. With the separation of powers as its underlying purpose, the
Speech or Debate Clause is best effectuated through an interpretation of
legislative privilege as an institutional guarantee. An institutional waiver is
limited in that it would only apply to the act in which it was created—
specifically, the STOCK Act. Because it would not apply wholesale to all
potential prosecutions of members of Congress, the institutional waiver
provides a more measured approach to balancing separation of powers
concerns than the all-or-nothing approach of the individual theory. An
institutional approach would allow a politically accountable Congress to
effectively legislate and hold corrupt members responsible under the
STOCK Act. The narrow scope of the Act prevents Executive abuse of its
prosecutorial authority, while an institutional waiver would simultaneously
prevent the misuse of the Executive Branch by Congress.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,
members of Congress enjoy an expansive legislative privilege of
nondisclosure within the District of Columbia. Rayburn is one of the
broadest interpretations of legislative privilege as an individual guarantee
to members of Congress. In developing legislative privilege doctrine,
courts have looked to the threat posed to Congress by limiting legislative
privilege and the potential danger of allowing for corruption in Congress by
broadening privilege, but courts have not openly considered the potential
negative effects of broadening privilege on all of the branches.
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The reach of legislative privilege has created an incentive structure
that allowed Congress to avoid assuming any real risk of criminal or civil
sanctions while misusing the Executive Branch in its capacity as enforcer
of the STOCK Act. In order to maintain the separation of powers that the
Speech or Debate Clause is intended to protect, Congress should amend the
STOCK Act to explicitly waive legislative privilege or the courts should
read legislative privilege waiver into the STOCK Act under the
institutional interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause. Waiver would
restore a proper balance between the branches and ensure that legislative
action—and in turn the will of the people—is adequately effected.
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